Wesley Aaron Shafer, JR. v. South Carolina (532 U.S. 36)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided March 20, 2001 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 532 U.S. 36 · 121 S. Ct. 1263
- Decided
- March 20, 2001
- Term
- October Term 2000
- Vote
- 7–2
- Majority author
- Justice Ginsburg
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Reversed and remanded
- Outcome
- Petitioning party won
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the right of a defendant in a capital case to inform the jury that, under the governing state law, he would not be eligible for parole in the event that the jury sentences him to life imprisonment. In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994), this Court held that where a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant “to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U. S. 156, 165 (2000) (plurality opinion) (describing Simmons’ premise and plurality opinion). The case we now confront involves a death sentence returned by a jury instructed both that “life imprisonment means until death of the offender,” and that “[p]arole eligibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration.” 340 S. C. 291, 297, 531 S. E. 2d 524, 527 (2000). It presents the question whether the South Carolina Supreme Court misread our precedent when it declared Simmons inapplicable to South Carolina’s current sentencing scheme. We hold that South Carolina’s Supreme Court incorrectly limited Simmons and therefore reverse that court’s judgment. I In April 1997, in the course of an…
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