Taylor James Bloate v. United States (559 U.S. 196)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided March 8, 2010 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 559 U.S. 196 · 130 S. Ct. 1345
- Decided
- March 8, 2010
- Term
- October Term 2009
- Vote
- 7–2
- Majority author
- Justice Thomas
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Reversed
- Outcome
- Petitioning party won
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Speedy Trial Act or Act), 18 U. S. C. § 3161 et seq., requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within 70 days after he is charged or makes an initial appearance, whichever is later, see § 3161(c)(1), and entitles him to dismissal of the charges if that deadline is not met, § 3162(a)(2). The Act, however, excludes from the 70-day period delays due to certain enumerated events. § 3161(h) (2006 ed. and Supp. II). As relevant here, “delay resulting from .. . proceedings concerning the defendant” is automatically excludable from a Speedy Trial Act calculation. § 3161(h)(1) (hereinafter subsection (h)(1)). In addition, “delay resulting from a continuance” granted by the district court may be excluded if the district court makes the findings required by § 3161(h)(7) (2006 ed., Supp. II) (hereinafter subsection (h)(7)). This case requires us to decide the narrow question whether time granted to a party to prepare pretrial motions is automatically excludable from the Act’s 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1), or whether such time may be excluded only if a court makes case-specific findings under subsection (h)(7). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that pretrial motion preparation time is automatically ex-cludable under subsection (h)(1). 534 F. 3d 893, 898 (2008). We granted…
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