Robert James Tennard v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (542 U.S. 274)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided June 24, 2004 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 542 U.S. 274 · 124 S. Ct. 2562
- Decided
- June 24, 2004
- Term
- October Term 2003
- Vote
- 6–3
- Majority author
- Justice O'Connor
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Reversed and remanded
- Outcome
- Petitioning party won
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), we held that the Texas capital sentencing scheme provided a constitutionally inadequate vehicle for jurors to consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse the petitioner had presented. The petitioner in this case argues that the same scheme was inadequate for jurors to give effect to his evidence of low intelligence. The Texas courts rejected his claim, and a Federal District Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484 (2000), and therefore hold that a certificate of appealability should have issued. I Petitioner Robert Tennard was convicted by a jury of capital murder in October 1986. The evidence presented at trial indicated that Tennard and two accomplices killed two of his neighbors and robbed their house. Tennard himself stabbed one of the victims to death, and one of the accomplices killed the other victim with a hatchet. During the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel called only one witness — Tennard’s parole officer — who testified that Tennard’s Department of Corrections record from a prior incarceration indicated that he had an IQ…
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