Reed et al. v. Ross (468 U.S. 1)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided June 27, 1984 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 468 U.S. 1 · 104 S. Ct. 2901
- Decided
- June 27, 1984
- Term
- October Term 1983
- Vote
- 5–4
- Majority author
- Justice Brennan
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Outcome
- Petitioning party lost
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. In March 1969, respondent Daniel Ross was convicted of first-degree murder in North Carolina and sentenced to life imprisonment. At trial, Ross had claimed lack of malice and self-defense. In accordance with well-settled North Carolina law, the trial judge instructed the jury that Ross, the defendant, had the burden of proving each of these defenses. Six years later, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), which struck, down, as violative of due process, the requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proving lack of malice. Id., at 704. Two years later, Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233 (1977), held that Mullaney was to have retroactive application. The question presented in this case is whether Ross’ attorney forfeited Ross’ right to relief under Mullaney and Hankerson by failing, several years before those cases were decided, to raise on appeal the unconstitutionality of the jury instruction on the burden of proof. I A In 1970, this Court decided In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, the first case in which we directly addressed the constitutional foundation of the requirement that criminal guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. That case held that “[l]est there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, . . . the Due Process Clause protects the…
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