Medtronic, Inc. v. Lora Lohr et Vir (518 U.S. 470)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided June 26, 1996 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 518 U.S. 470 · 116 S. Ct. 2240
- Decided
- June 26, 1996
- Term
- October Term 1995
- Vote
- 5–4
- Majority author
- Justice Stevens
- Issue area
- Federalism
- Disposition
- Affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded
- Outcome
- Petitioning party lost
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V, and VII, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and VI, in which Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join. Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, in the words of the statute’s preamble, “to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use.” 90 Stat. 539. The question presented is whether that statute pre-empts a state common-law negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective medical device. Specifically, we must consider whether Lora Lohr, who was injured when her pacemaker failed, may rely on Florida common law to recover damages from Med-tronic, Inc., the manufacturer of the device. HH Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens. Because these are “primarily, and historically,.. . matter[s] of local concern,” Hillsborough County v. Automated, Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 719 (1985), the “States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 756 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).…
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