Iowa v. Felipe Edgardo Tovar (541 U.S. 77)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided March 8, 2004 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 541 U.S. 77 · 124 S. Ct. 1379
- Decided
- March 8, 2004
- Term
- October Term 2003
- Vote
- 9–0
- Majority author
- Justice Ginsburg
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Reversed and remanded
- Outcome
- Petitioning party won
- Ideological direction
- Conservative
Opinion excerpt
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 170 (1985); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 224 (1967). The entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a “critical stage” at which the right to counsel adheres. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 34 (1972); White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a “knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances.” Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation. Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that “waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked”; and (2) “admonis[h]” the defendant “that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain…
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