Federal Trade Commission, Petitioner v. Actavis, Inc., et al. (570 U.S. 136)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided June 17, 2013 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 570 U.S. 136 · 133 S. Ct. 2223
- Decided
- June 17, 2013
- Term
- October Term 2012
- Vote
- 5–3
- Majority author
- Justice Breyer
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Reversed
- Outcome
- Petitioning party won
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent's term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a "reverse payment" settlement agreement. And the basic question here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Sherman Act prohibition of " restraint[s] of trade or commerce"). Cf. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 111 S.Ct. 401, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990) (per curiam ) (invalidating agreement not to compete). In this case, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complaint claiming that a particular reverse payment settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws. In doing so, the Circuit stated that a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is "immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent." FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc ., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012). And since the alleged…
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