Erick Cornell Clay v. United States (537 U.S. 522)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided March 4, 2003 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 537 U.S. 522 · 123 S. Ct. 1072
- Decided
- March 4, 2003
- Term
- October Term 2002
- Vote
- 9–0
- Majority author
- Justice Ginsburg
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Reversed and remanded
- Outcome
- Petitioning party won
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 is subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” §2255, ¶ 6(1). This case concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court, does the judgment become “final” for post-conviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari expires? In accord with this Court’s consistent understanding of finality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of starting the clock on §2255’s one-year limitation period, we hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court’s affirmation of the conviction. I In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of arson…
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