Derrick Morgan v. Illinois (504 U.S. 719)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided June 15, 1992 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 504 U.S. 719 · 112 S. Ct. 2222
- Decided
- June 15, 1992
- Term
- October Term 1991
- Vote
- 6–3
- Majority author
- Justice White
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Reversed and remanded
- Outcome
- Petitioning party won
- Ideological direction
- Liberal
Opinion excerpt
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide here whether, during voir dire for a capital offense, a state trial court may, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, refuse inquiry into whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the defendant. I The trial of a capital offense in Illinois is conducted in two phases. The defendant must first be convicted of first-degree murder, as defined in Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(a) (Supp. 1990). Illinois law uses the same jury that decided guilt to determine whether the death penalty shall be imposed, and upon conviction, a separate sentencing heating commences to determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. ¶ 9—1(d)(1). To be eligible for the death penalty, the jury must find unanimously, ¶ 9—1(g), and beyond a reasonable doubt, ¶ 9-1(f), that the defendant was at least 18 years old at the time of the murder, and that at least 1 of 10 enumerated aggravating factors exists, ¶ 9—1(b). See, e. g., ¶ 9-1(b)(5) (murder for hire or by contract); ¶ 9-1(b)(10) (premeditated murder by preconceived plan). If the jury finds none of the statutory aggravating factors to exist, the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment. ¶ 9-l(g). “If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b)…
Excerpt of a 31,542-character opinion. The full text and citation network load in the interactive viewer above.