Cornell Johnson v. United States (529 U.S. 694)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided May 15, 2000 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 529 U.S. 694 · 120 S. Ct. 1795
- Decided
- May 15, 2000
- Term
- October Term 1999
- Vote
- 8–1
- Majority author
- Justice Souter
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Outcome
- Petitioning party lost
- Ideological direction
- Conservative
Opinion excerpt
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case grows out of an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to the retroactive application of 18 U. S. C. § 3583(h), which authorizes a district court to impose an additional term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of those who violate the conditions of an initial term. The United States argues that district courts had the power to do so under the prior law, and that this cures any ex post facto problems. We agree with the Government as to the interpretation of prior law, and we find that consideration of the Ex Post Facto Clause is unnecessary. I In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1999, Congress eliminated most forms of parole in favor of supervised release, a form of postconfinement monitoring overseen by the sentencing court, rather than the Parole Commission. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 400-401 (1991). The sentencing court was authorized to impose a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment, with the maximum length of the term varying according to the severity of the initial offense. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 3583(a), (b). While on supervised release, the offender was required to abide by certain conditions, some specified by statute and some imposable at the court’s discretion. See § 3583(d). Upon violation of a condition, 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3)…
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