Clarence Victor v. Nebraska (511 U.S. 1)
U.S. Supreme Court · decided March 22, 1994 · Supreme Court Database (Spaeth)
- Citation
- 511 U.S. 1 · 114 S. Ct. 1239
- Decided
- March 22, 1994
- Term
- October Term 1993
- Vote
- 7–2
- Majority author
- Justice O'Connor
- Issue area
- Criminal Procedure
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Outcome
- Petitioning party lost
- Ideological direction
- Conservative
Opinion excerpt
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). Although this standard is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication. In these cases, we consider the constitutionality of two attempts to define “reasonable doubt.” I The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Cf. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 440-441 (1887). Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 320, n. 14 (1979), the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 485-486 (1978). Rather, “taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 140 (1954). In only one case have we held that a definition of reasonable doubt violated the Due Process Clause. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). There, the jurors were told: “ ‘[A reasonable doubt]…
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