NRSC v. FEC (24-621)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2025-12-09
- Decided
- 2026-06-30
- Vote
- 6-3 for NRSC
- Opinion
- Justice Kavanaugh
- Majority
- Kavanaugh, Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Barrett
- Dissent
- Kagan, Sotomayor, Jackson
Holding
Reversed the en banc Sixth Circuit, 6-3 for the NRSC. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. Held: FECA's political-party coordinated-expenditure limits, 52 U.S.C. §30116(d), violate the First Amendment. Under the 'rigorous' closely-drawn scrutiny of McCutcheon and Cruz, the limits are not proportionate, necessary, or narrowly tailored, because the Government's anti-circumvention interest is already served by less-speech-restrictive tools (the base contribution limits PLUS the earmarking rules of §30116(a)(8) PLUS the disclosure requirements of §30104(b)). The Court rejected the amicus/intervenors' stare decisis argument: Colorado II's deferential-scrutiny reasoning 'has been rejected by the Court's more recent precedents and is no longer good law,' and 'to the extent that Colorado II has retained any vitality, it is now overruled.' On jurisdiction, the Court held the dispute justiciable: then-candidate (now VP) Vance had standing, with an active Statement of Candidacy on file for a 2028 Senate run — reaching the merits and declining the DIG/mootness off-ramp exactly as the OA evidence suggested.
Pre-decision prediction
NRSC 6-3 (82% confidence).
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Kavanaugh (15,749 words total).
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 24–621.
Argued December 9, 2025—Decided June 30, 2026
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) restricts a political party’s spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates. 52 U. S. C. §30116(d). In 2001, this Court upheld those coordinatedexpenditure limits as consistent with the First Amendment. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431 (Colorado II ). Petitioners—a group of candidates and political party committees—challenged FECA’s politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits under the First Amendment, arguing that Colorado II is no longer good law. In light of Colorado II, the en banc U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected petitioners’ First Amendment challenge. This Court granted certiorari. Held: FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Pp. 6–26. (a) The Court has jurisdiction under Article III. At the outset of the litigation, at least one of the plaintiffs—then-candidate for Senate JD Vance—undisputedly had standing. Vice President Vance still maintains an active “Statement of Candidacy” on file with the FEC indicating his intent to run for Senate in 2028, as well as a campaign committee that has raised money for a Senate race, establishing that this dispute is justiciable. Pp. 5–6. (b) The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” This Court has determined that political parties—as well as candidates, private individuals, and outside groups—may make unlimited independent expenditures during political campaigns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 39–59 (per curiam). This case concerns FECA’s limits on spending by political
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Syllabus parties in coordination with candidates. Pp. 6–21. (1) FECA limits political-party coordinated expenditures. FECA’s limits impair the party’s traditional forms of communication such as advertisements; preclude parties from amplifying the voice of their adherents; impose additional monetary costs and burdens on political parties; and inflict a “stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 630 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Pp. 7–8. (2) Statutory limits on contributions to candidates or parties are subject to “closely drawn” scrutiny. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 197 (plurality opinion). To satisfy that standard, a regulation may not be “disproportionate” and must be “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to its asserted goal. Id., at 199, 218, 220; Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 306. The Court must assess: (i) the Government’s asserted interests in imposing the limits at issue and (ii) the fit between the limits and the Government’s asserted interests. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199.; see also Cruz, 596 U. S., at 305. The political-party coordinated-expenditure limits fail to satisfy the closely drawn test. Pp. 8–10. (3) To analyze FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures, the Court must first assess the asserted governmental interests justifying those limits. The Court’s precedents recognize only one constitutionally permissible government objective for campaign finance restrictions: “preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 206–207. And “Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.” Id., at 207. Particularly relevant here, this Court has recognized the risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when a donor’s contributions to a political party are earmarked—that is, “are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder.” Id., at 211 (quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the First Amendment question in this case boils down to whether FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures are permissible in order to prevent circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates through earmarked contributions to parties. In Colorado II, this Court said that they were. 533 U. S., at 462–463. But Colorado II applied deferential scrutiny to Congress’s politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits. Id., at 463, n. 26, 465. Since Colorado II, however, the Court has emphasized that under the closely drawn test, judicial review must be “rigorous.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 197. Under that more demanding standard, the Court agrees with petitioners that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are not proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored given the other less-speech-restrictive tools available to the Government to prevent
Syllabus circumvention—in particular, earmarking and disclosure laws. With respect to earmarking laws: FECA treats an individual’s contributions to a party that are “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit” to a federal candidate “as contributions from such person to such candidate”—and thus subject to the limits on contributions to candidates. 52 U. S. C. §30116(a)(8). In McCutcheon, the Court explained that such earmarking rules constitute a targeted and constitutionally permissible way for the Government to prohibit circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates. 572 U. S., at 222–223. As JUSTICE THOMAS has explained: “Vigilant enforcement” of the earmarking rules is a more “precise response” by the Government to any “circumvention concerns.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 481 (dissenting opinion). With respect to disclosure laws: FECA requires that political parties and candidates publicly disclose both the contributions they receive and their spending on campaign activities, including on coordinated expenditures. §30104(b). As the Court emphasized in McCutcheon, disclosure has become a much stronger anti-circumvention tool over time because of “modern technology,” especially the Internet. 572 U. S., at 224. Importantly, it is the combination of the base contribution limits plus the earmarking rules plus the disclosure requirements together that serve the Government’s anti-circumvention interests here—without unduly restricting core political party speech. Given the meaningful prophylactic measures available to combat quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, the Court concludes that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits at issue here are “disproportionate” and are not “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” for the circumvention interest. Id., at 199, 218, 220 (quotation marks omitted); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306. Pp. 10–21. (c) Amicus and intervenors contend that the Court should adhere to Colorado II as a matter of stare decisis, but Colorado II ’s reasoning has been rejected by the Court’s more recent precedents and is no longer good law. To the extent that Colorado II has retained any vitality, it is now overruled. Pp. 21–26. 117 F. 4th 389, reversed and remanded. KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE, COMMISSION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [June 30, 2026]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. Ratified in 1791, the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” As relevant here, the Federal Election Campaign Act, known as FECA, limits a political party’s campaign spending. Those spending limits necessarily abridge political parties’ freedom of speech: Because “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money,” a “restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). Applying the First Amendment, this Court has long ruled that a political party possesses a right to make unlimited independent expenditures during a campaign—that is, expenditures without coordinating with a candidate. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal
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