Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security v. Doe (25-1083)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2026-04-29
- Decided
- 2026-06-25
- Vote
- 6-3 for Mullin / DHS
- Opinion
- Justice Alito (plurality in part)
- Majority
- Alito, Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, Barrett
- Dissent
- Kagan, Sotomayor, Jackson
Holding
Reversed and remanded 6-3 for the Government. Alito announced the judgment and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part III-A; Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh joined in full, Gorsuch and Barrett joined except Part III-A; Thomas concurred; Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. Holding tracks the predicted frame closely: Part 1 holds the TPS statute bars judicial review of all non-constitutional claims because 'determination' in § 1254a(b)(5)(A) — whether read as the ultimate decision or the whole process — squarely covers respondents' APA claims, and 'with respect to' has a broadening effect (citing Patel). The Court then reached the sole surviving constitutional claim and held the Miot respondents' equal-protection challenge is unlikely to succeed: assuming arguendo heightened scrutiny and an Arlington Heights motivating-factor inquiry, none of the cited Presidential/Secretarial statements was overtly racial and respondents' own race-neutral explanation (the administration opposes the TPS program as implemented) undercuts the claim.
Pre-decision prediction
Mullin (DHS) 6-3 (74% confidence).
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Alito (plurality in part) (14,315 words total).
MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 25–1083.
Argued April 29, 2026—Decided June 25, 2026*
The question presented is whether respondents, who challenge the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for aliens from Syria and Haiti, are entitled to orders postponing the terminations during litigation. Congress created TPS in 1990 to provide short-term humanitarian relief for aliens who cannot safely return to their home countries. Although designed to afford temporary relief, TPS designations in practice have often lasted for decades. Syria received a TPS designation in 2012 because of “extraordinary and temporary conditions” related to the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad, 77 Fed. Reg. 19027, and in September 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security provided public notice that Syria’s TPS designation would terminate, 90 Fed. Reg. 45402. Seven Syrian nationals sued in the Southern District of New York asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to stop the termination. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to interim relief under 5 U. S. C. §705. The Second Circuit denied the Government’s request for a stay. Haiti received a TPS designation in 2010 after a devastating earthquake, 75 Fed. Reg. 3477, and in November 2025, the Secretary provided public notice that Haiti’s TPS designation would terminate, 90 Fed. Reg. 54739. Five Haitian nationals sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia asserting claims under the APA and charging —————— *Together with No. 25–1084, Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Miot et al., on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Syllabus that the termination of Haiti’s TPS designation violated the constitutional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race. The District Court granted interim relief, and a divided D. C. Circuit panel declined to issue a stay. The Government sought a stay and a writ of certiorari before judgment in both cases. This Court granted review, consolidated the cases, and deferred ruling on the stay applications.
Held: 1. The TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims. Pp. 12–18. (a) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) provides that “[t]here is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.” The term “determination” may mean either an individual decision or the process leading to a decision. Under either understanding, §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all of respondents’ non-constitutional claims. Further, the phrase “with respect to” “generally has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 12– 13. (b) Respondents and the courts below offer no sound theories to overcome the plain meaning of the judicial-review bar. Pp. 13–18. (1) Respondents’ argument that §1254a(b)(5)(A) applies only to substantive claims, not those based on alleged procedural errors, finds no support in the statutory language because a “determination” may concern procedural or substantive questions. Respondents’ reliance on McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, and Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, is misplaced because those decisions turned on the specific wording of different provisions and did not adopt the broad principle that the term “determination” applies only to substantive matters. Pp. 13–15. (2) Doe respondents’ argument that “determination” refers only to an assessment of country conditions finds no support in the statute’s text or context and contravenes the principle that we give common terms their ordinary meaning. See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. 338, 353. Pp. 15–17. (3) Respondents’ attempt to limit the judicial-review bar to the Secretary’s ultimate “determination”—not any subsidiary decision—is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory text and contradicts the administrative-law principle that subsidiary decisions merge into final agency action. See Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U. S. 590, 597–598. Pp. 17–18. 2. Miot respondents’ equal protection claim—that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of race—is unlikely to succeed.
Syllabus Ironically, respondents themselves offer a race-neutral explanation for the Government’s action: namely, that the current administration, which has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for renewal, simply opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in the past. The Court assumes for the sake of argument that heightened scrutiny applies and that it must determine whether a “discriminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor in the decision” to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265–266. Because application of that standard calls for consideration of the context in which a challenged statement was made, id., at 267–268, the immigration context is an important factor. None of the cited statements by either the President or the Secretary was overtly racial, and in substance all expressed policy views that could rest on race-neutral justifications. Viewing all the relevant evidence, Miot respondents are unlikely to prove that race was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, and it follows that they are not entitled to interim relief on their equal protection claim. Pp. 20–24. Reversed and remanded. ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part III–A. ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and GORSUCH and BARRETT, JJ., joined except for Part III–A. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
Nos. 25–1083 and 25–1084 _________________
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