Monsanto Co. v. Durnell (24-1068)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2026-04-27
- Decided
- 2026-06-25
- Vote
- 7-2 for Monsanto
- Opinion
- Justice Kavanaugh
- Majority
- Kavanaugh, Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett
- Dissent
- Jackson, Gorsuch
Holding
FIFRA express-preemption case. Under 7 U.S.C. 136v(b) ('Uniformity'), a State 'shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under' FIFRA. EPA has repeatedly registered Roundup and approved its label WITHOUT a cancer warning, and EPA regulations require a manufacturer to use the EPA-approved label unless and until EPA approves or requires a change. Durnell's Missouri failure-to-warn tort claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning. Held (Kavanaugh): the claim is expressly preempted because it would impose a labeling requirement 'in addition to or different from' the federal one. State tort duties are 'labeling requirements' (Bates v. Dow); EPA's safety-side registration determinations 'give content to FIFRA's misbranding standards' and are 'requirements under' FIFRA; and Riegel v. Medtronic — a materially identical preemption clause — is dispositive. The Court rejected all four of Durnell's counterarguments, including the 136a(f)(2) 'registration is not a defense' argument the model had flagged as a likely basis for a Durnell win.
Pre-decision prediction
Durnell 7-2 (72% confidence).
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Kavanaugh (15,301 words total).
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSOURI, EASTERN DISTRICT No. 24–1068.
Argued April 27, 2026—Decided June 25, 2026
Monsanto Company manufactures and distributes Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide designed to control weeds. The EPA has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate and repeatedly concluded that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer. EPA’s assessment is shared by many other regulatory bodies around the world. In accordance with EPA’s view that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer in humans, EPA has not required labels on glyphosate-based pesticides like Roundup to include a cancer warning. In 2019, John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, alleging that he had used Monsanto’s Roundup products for about 20 years and that they had caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. As relevant here, Durnell brought a failure-to-warn tort claim, asserting that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. A jury agreed and awarded Durnell more than $1 million on the failureto-warn theory. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, 707 S. W. 3d 828. The Court of Appeals rejected Monsanto’s argument that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act expressly preempted Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim, see 7 U. S. C. §136v(b). This Court granted certiorari. Held: FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup’s label. Pp. 9–22. (a) FIFRA’s preemption clause, entitled “Uniformity,” provides that a “State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.” 7 U. S. C. §136v(b). FIFRA therefore preempts a state-law labeling requirement that differs from the
Syllabus federal labeling requirements imposed under FIFRA. Pp. 9–14. (1) To register a pesticide, EPA must approve the pesticide’s label by determining that the label contains all warnings “necessary and . . . adequate to protect health and the environment” and that the label does not include any “false or misleading” statements. §§136a(c)(5)(B), 136(q)(1)(A), (G). After EPA approves a pesticide’s label at registration, manufacturers are legally required to use that label unless and until EPA approves or requires a label change and amends the pesticide’s registration. See §136a(f)(1); 40 CFR §§152.44(a), 156.70(c). If a manufacturer does not use the EPA-approved label, it may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. See 7 U. S. C. §§136l, 136j(a)(1)(E). Federal law therefore requires Monsanto to sell Roundup with the label that EPA approved at the initial registration and that EPA has subsequently re-approved on multiple occasions—that is, the label without a cancer warning. Meanwhile, as the Court’s precedents make clear and as the parties agree, state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 443–444. Durnell’s state tort claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to its labels, which is “in addition to” and “different from” Monsanto’s federal-law labeling obligations. Pp. 9–11. (2) The Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U. S. 312, further confirms that Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is expressly preempted. In Riegel, the Court addressed the preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, which is nearly identical to FIFRA’s preemption clause. Id., at 316; see 21 U. S. C. §360k(a). The Riegel Court concluded that FDA’s premarket approval of devices imposed “ ‘requirements’ under” the Act’s preemption clause, 552 U. S., at 322, and therefore that FDA’s premarket approval of a medical device preempted state-law claims premised on additional or contrary safety requirements. Id., at 323–325. Pp. 11–14. (b) Durnell’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. Pp. 14–22. (1) Durnell contends that a Missouri failure-to-warn claim, like FIFRA itself, simply requires manufacturers to include adequate warnings to protect human health and not to include false or misleading statements. But that argument operates at far too high a level of generality and disregards the central and comprehensive role that EPA performs in making labeling determinations under FIFRA’s registration provisions. Pp. 14–15. (2) Durnell argues that EPA’s regulations and its procedures for registering pesticides and approving pesticide labels exceed or contravene EPA’s statutory authority under FIFRA. Durnell is incorrect. FIFRA empowers EPA to “prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of [FIFRA],” §136w(a)(1), and expressly directs EPA to register pesticides and “determin[e]” that the pesticide’s “labeling” complies
Syllabus with FIFRA’s many specific requirements. §136a(c)(5)(B). During that extensive registration process, EPA critically evaluates the pesticide’s label to ensure that the label contains all warnings necessary to protect human health. And after EPA decides the appropriate warnings for a pesticide’s label, a manufacturer is legally required to use that label unless and until EPA subsequently approves or requires a new label. 40 CFR §§152.44(a), 156.70(c). Pp. 15–16. (3) Durnell seizes on 7 U. S. C. §136a(f)(2), which provides that registration shall not be “construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under [FIFRA],” but that registration is “prima facie” evidence of compliance with the registration provisions. By its text, §136a(f)(2) does not apply to state tort suits; that provision simply clarifies that registration does not bar EPA enforcement actions against manufacturers for violating FIFRA. Additionally, Monsanto is not invoking the mere fact of “registration” as a complete defense to state tort suits but rather is relying on EPA’s specific determination that cancer warnings are not required for glyphosate-based pesticide labels. This argument also contravenes Riegel, where the possibility that FDA could withdraw its premarket approval based on new evidence or new analysis did not preclude the Court from concluding that FDA’s premarket approval imposed “requirements” on manufacturers that preempted state tort suits under the Medical Device Amendments’ materially identical preemption clause. 552 U. S., at 322–323. Pp. 16– 20. 707 S. W. 3d 828, reversed and remanded. KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
MONSANTO COMPANY, PETITIONER v. JOHN L. DURNELL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSOURI, EASTERN DISTRICT [June 25, 2026]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. Under authority granted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Environmental Protection Agency regulates pesticides, including pesticide labels. As relevant here, EPA regulates Roundup, a glyphosate-based pesticide manufactured by Monsanto. Because EPA has repeatedly concluded that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer, the agency has not required a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Importantly, EPA’s regulations require a pesticide manufacturer such as Monsanto to use the EPA-approved pesticide label—here, the Roundup label without a cancer warning—unless and until EPA approves or requires a different label. Moreover, to ensure “[u]niformity” in labeling, FIFRA’s preemption clause prohibits States from imposing any pesticide labeling requirements that are “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling requirements “under” FIFRA. 7 U. S. C. §136v(b). John Durnell brought a failure-to-warn tort suit in Missouri state court against Monsanto for not including a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Durnell alleged that
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