Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel (24-783)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2026-02-24
- Decided
- 2026-04-22
- Vote
- 9-0 for Nessel
- Opinion
- Justice Sotomayor
- Majority
- Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
Holding
Justice Sotomayor delivered a UNANIMOUS 9-0 opinion. The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)'s 30-day removal deadline is not subject to equitable tolling. The Court reasoned that the text is mandatory ('shall be filed within 30 days'); the structure includes an 'explicit listing of exceptions' (§ 1446(b)(3) discovery rule, § 1446(c)(1) one-year cap, § 1441(d) foreign-state cause-shown extension) that strongly indicates Congress did not intend additional equitable exceptions; the federal civil removal statutes have an 'obvious concern with efficiency' (BP plc v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (2021)); and Congress's separate provision in § 1455(b)(1) for criminal removal extensions confirms the intentional omission of similar power for civil cases. The decision affirmed the Sixth Circuit (104 F.4th 958) — Enbridge's removal 887 days after being served was untimely. Notably, the Court did not need to decide whether § 1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling, because even assuming the presumption applies, it can be 'rebutted if there is good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply' (Arellano v. McDonough, 2023).
Pre-decision prediction
Nessel 5-4 (55% confidence).
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Sotomayor (5,532 words total).
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 24–783.
Argued February 24, 2026—Decided April 22, 2026
Petitioners (collectively Enbridge) own and operate Line 5, a 645-mile petroleum pipeline, 4 miles of which traverse the Straits of Mackinac pursuant to a 1953 easement granted to Enbridge’s predecessor by the State of Michigan. On June 27, 2019, the Michigan Attorney General filed suit in Michigan state court seeking to halt Enbridge’s operation of Line 5 by having the 1953 easement declared void and Enbridge’s continuing operations declared unlawful. Enbridge was served with the complaint on July 12, 2019. Rather than removing the case to federal court within the 30-day deadline required by 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1), Enbridge litigated in state court for months. In November 2020, more than a year after Enbridge’s removal deadline had lapsed, the Michigan Governor issued a notice revoking the 1953 easement and filed a separate lawsuit in state court against Enbridge. In that suit, unlike in the Attorney General’s suit, Enbridge timely removed to federal court, and the parties agreed to hold the Attorney General’s case in abeyance while federal proceedings progressed. After the District Court denied the Governor’s motion to remand, finding federalquestion jurisdiction satisfied, the Governor voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit. On December 15, 2021—887 days after receiving the Attorney General’s complaint—Enbridge removed this action to federal court. The Attorney General moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under §1446(b)’s 30-day deadline. The District Court denied the motion, holding that equitable principles justified excusing Enbridge’s untimely removal, and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although
Syllabus §1446(b)(1)’s deadline is nonjurisdictional, several features of §1446(b)(1) and the overall removal scheme rebutted any presumption of equitable tolling. Thus, the lawsuit had to be remanded to the Michigan state court. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a divide among the Courts of Appeals on whether §1446(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling.
Held: Because §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal was untimely. Pp. 5–14. (a) The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in §1446(b)(1) is nonjurisdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable tolling. While jurisdictional requirements “cannot be waived or forfeited” and “do not allow for equitable exceptions,” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203, “[t]he mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdictional force . . . does not render it malleable in every respect,” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192. Some nonjurisdictional rules remain “mandatory” and “are not susceptible” of equitable tolling. Ibid. The Court need not decide whether §1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling because, even if the presumption applies, it can be “rebutted if ‘there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.’ ” Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U. S. 1, 7. Here, the text, structure, and context of §1446(b)(1) demonstrate that Congress did not want the 30-day deadline to be equitably tolled. The text of §1446(b)(1) speaks in strict, mandatory terms, requiring that a notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days.” Although such mandatory language alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling, it is consistent with treating the deadline as mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling. Cf. Boechler, 596 U. S., at 204, 211. More important, and decisive here, is §1446(b)(1)’s structure. An “explicit listing of exceptions,” set forth in a detailed manner, strongly indicates “that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute.” United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352. That is especially so when the “specific exceptions” already “reflect equitable considerations.” Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7. There are several such exceptions here. First, and functioning much like an equitable discovery rule, §1446(b)(3) provides an extension when a case at first appears unremovable but it is later “ascertained that the case is” (or has become) removable. Congress thus “has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling” in one respect but not others. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48. Section 1446(c)(1) also imposes a one-year cap on this rule in diversity cases, but creates an exception if a plaintiff acted in “bad faith,”
Syllabus specifically “account[ing] for equitable factors” in a way that would be superfluous if §1446(b)(1) already provided for equitable tolling more broadly. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 10. Exceptions to the 30-day deadline outside of §1446 confirm the point. For actions against foreign states, Congress specifically allowed “the time limitations of §1446(b) . . . [to] be enlarged at any time for cause shown.” §1441(d). Similar provisions exist for certain intellectualproperty cases, see §1454(b)(2), and cases involving fatal accidents, see §1441(e)(1). Each provision explicitly incorporates §1446(b)(1)’s time limit but modifies it to allow equitable, case-specific exceptions that would be inexplicable and unnecessary if Congress already understood §1446(b)(1) to contain a cross-cutting equitable-tolling rule. Congress’s treatment of removal in criminal proceedings provides additional confirmation. Under §1455(b)(1), a criminal defendant must generally remove within 30 days after arraignment, but “for good cause shown [a court] may . . . gran[t] . . . leave to file . . . at a later time.” For civil cases, by contrast, Congress did not provide courts with a similar general power to extend the 30-day removal deadline. “[T]he nature of the subject matter” here further underscores the unavailability of equitable tolling. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14. The federal civil removal statutes have an “obvious concern with efficiency,” BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 245, and a “general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits questions,” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 237. Allowing equitable tolling would undermine Congress’s manifest interest in resolving threshold removal questions early and conclusively, generating uncertainty and risking significant waste of resources. Cf. Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 49. Pp. 5–10. (b) Enbridge’s counterarguments are not persuasive. Enbridge’s argument that rebutting the presumption of equitable tolling requires the “clearest command” from Congress conflicts with the Court’s repeated holdings that the presumption is rebutted where “Congress’s choice is evident,” Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14; where tolling would be “inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute,” Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48; and where there is “good reason to believe Congress did not want equitable tolling to apply,” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 350. None of these decisions required the “clearest command” that Enbridge demands. Enbridge’s attempt to characterize §1446(b)(3) as an accrual rule rather than an exception does not account for the separate “bad faith” exception in §1446(c)(1) or the many other provisions outside §1446 that expressly allow courts to toll §1446(b)(1)’s deadline “for cause shown.” The fact that these provisions are located outside of §1446 itself does not diminish their force; courts must consider equitable tolling’s “incongruen[ce] with the statutory scheme” overall. Arellano, 598
Syllabus U. S., at 13. Enbridge cannot identify any sensible reason why Congress would have adopted so many express, specific equitable exceptions to §1446(b)(1) if equitable tolling was already available for belated removals across the board. Finally, Enbridge’s argument based on §1447(c)’s treatment of defects in subject-matter jurisdiction does not support equitable tolling. Pp. 11–14.
104 F. 4th 958, affirmed. SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Excerpt of 8 of 37 paragraphs. Full opinion available on the interactive page or in the official PDF.
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