Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish (24-813)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2026-01-12
- Decided
- 2026-04-17
- Vote
- 7-1 for Chevron
- Opinion
- Justice Thomas
- Majority
- Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett
- Recused
- Alito
Holding
Justice Thomas delivered a 7-1 opinion (with Alito recused). The majority — Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett — held that Chevron's WWII crude-oil production 'relates to' its federal duty to refine crude oil into avgas for the military, satisfying the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). Jackson concurred in the judgment only.
Pre-decision prediction
Plaquemines Parish 6-2 (60% confidence).
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Thomas (6,623 words total).
LOUISIANA, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 24–813.
Argued January 12, 2026—Decided April 17, 2026
The federal officer removal statute, 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1), authorizes removal of state-court suits against federal officers or persons “acting under” them “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” This case concerns whether, for purposes of the statute, a state-court environmental suit challenging Chevron’s crude-oil production during the Second World War is “for or relating to” Chevron’s wartime refining of crude oil into aviation gasoline for the U. S. military. In 1978, Louisiana enacted the State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act, which prohibited certain uses of Louisiana’s coastal zone, including oil production, without a permit. The Act exempted uses legally commenced before 1980. In 2013, Plaquemines Parish and other parishes filed 42 state-court suits against oil and gas companies under the Act. They alleged that the companies lacked permits and that some uses, although initiated before 1980, were illegally commenced and therefore not covered by the exemption. An expert report filed by the parish made clear that it intended to challenge certain defendants’ crude-oil production during the Second World War. The report alleged that Chevron failed to use steel tanks instead of earthen pits, should not have used vertical-drilling methods, and failed to equip fields with sufficient roads, using canals instead. Chevron removed the suit to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that the suit “relat[ed] to” its contractual duties to refine crude oil into avgas for the military during the war. The District Court rejected this argument and granted the parish’s motion to remand to state court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Chevron had “acted under” a federal officer as a military contractor
Syllabus but concluding that the suit was not “for or relating to” those acts because Chevron’s refining contract did not specify how to acquire crude oil. Judge Oldham dissented, reasoning that crude oil was “indispensable” to avgas, such that its production necessarily related to Chevron’s performance of its federal avgas refining duties.
Held: Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal avgas refining duties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one—and has therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal officer removal statute. Pp. 7–12. (a) The phrase “relating to” sweeps broadly, meaning “ ‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.’ ” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383. One thing can relate to another even if the connection is “indirect,” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 139; even if it was “not specifically designed to affect” it, ibid.; and even without a “strict causal relationship,” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 362. Accordingly, a removing defendant need not show that his federal duties specifically required or strictly caused the challenged conduct. The ordinary meaning of “relating to,” however, is not “so broad that it is meaningless.” Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn., 592 U. S. 80, 93 (THOMAS, J., concurring). The ordinary meaning requires a connection that is not “ ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral.’ ” Id., at 94. Ordinary readers would not understand the federal officer removal statute to reach all suits with any attenuated connection to federal duties. Pp. 7–9. (b) Chevron’s suit “relat[es] to” the performance of federal duties because Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged conduct and the performance of its federal duties. This suit implicates Chevron’s wartime efforts to produce and supply avgas’ essential feedstock, so it is closely connected to Chevron’s wartime avgas refining for the military. Much of the crude oil that Chevron produced in Plaquemines Parish was ultimately used for its own avgas refining, and the suit challenges Chevron’s actions that allowed it to increase its production of crude oil during wartime. The parish’s report alleged that Chevron’s use of the coastal zone had been illegally commenced because of its reliance on vertical-drilling methods, canals, and earthen pits—but using vertical-drilling methods maximized crude-oil production; using canals saved time and materials resulting in more timely oil production; and using earthen pits complied with the Government’s directive to preserve steel. The Government emphasized the importance of increasing Chevron’s crude-oil production to support avgas refining as part of the war effort, and it identified the oil field at
Syllabus issue as critical to the war program because it produced a preferential kind of crude oil for refining avgas. In this all-hands-on-deck, wartime context, Chevron needed to produce more crude oil as quickly as possible to facilitate more avgas refining, including its own. Pp. 9–10. (c) The Court disagrees with the Fifth Circuit’s two main reasons for ruling to the contrary. First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Chevron’s refining contract did not specify how to obtain or produce crude oil, so Chevron’s crude-oil production was unrelated to the performance of its federal refining duties. But the ordinary meaning of “relating to” does not require the defendant to show that his federal duties specifically invited his challenged conduct; Chevron’s contract did not have to expressly direct or invite Chevron’s crude-oil production for that conduct to “relate to” its avgas refining. Second, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Government’s allocation of crude oil to refineries severed any relation between producing and refining. But an act can relate to its consequences even when the causal chain includes actions by intermediaries, see Morales, 504 U. S. 374; producing crude oil relates to refining it into avgas, even if the Government acted as an intermediary allocating the crude oil to refineries. Pp. 10–11. (d) The Court also disagrees with Louisiana’s argument that the removal statute requires that the defendant was “acting under” a federal officer in taking the specific actions challenged in the suit. This theory is not consistent with the statutory text, which permits removal of suits against officers or their agents for acts that were not done under color of their offices, so long as the suits “relat[e] to” such acts. Louisiana’s interpretation would leave the “relating to” requirement with little, if any, independent function, impermissibly conflating the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal test. Pp. 11–12. 103 F. 4th 324, vacated and remanded. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., took no part in the decision of the case.
Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
CHEVRON USA INCORPORATED, ET AL., PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [April 17, 2026]
Excerpt of 8 of 46 paragraphs. Full opinion available on the interactive page or in the official PDF.
Read the slip opinion (PDF) · Interactive oral-argument transcript · All OT 2025 cases · All decisions
This static summary is shown when JavaScript is disabled. The full interactive analysis loads above.